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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the Eleventh Circuit decided that, professionally, Black 
women’s natural hairstyles could legally be limited to only the afro.1 
Black women2 may change their hair texture to make it straight, 
 
 1. See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016). An afro 
is a hairstyle where the hair is combed up and out forming a cloud or ball around the head. 
See Afro, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afro (last visited Jan. 1, 2019). It is 
typically worn by African/Black women with a more tightly curled texture and generally 
short to medium length or very recoiled hair. Id. 
 2. In this Note, I use the term Black women as a preference to refer to women of African 
descent, whether termed African American or otherwise. I also use the term Black hair to refer 
to the hair of Black women as a simpler designation and not about hair color. 
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wear a weave, or wear a wig.3 However, every other hairstyle 
involving Black women’s natural texture (outside the afro) may be 
banned.4 The decision was neither new nor groundbreaking. For 
almost forty years, federal courts have consistently ruled that when 
an employer chooses to hire or fire a Black woman for wearing her 
hair in a braid, twist, plait, cornrow, lock, or blonde, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act5—meant to protect individuals against employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of race—does not apply.6 
The 2016 decision in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions 
reinforced the long precedent that the micromanagement of Black 
women in the workplace is quite all right.7 In that case, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought an action 
alleging that Catastrophe Management had engaged in race 
discrimination in violation of Title VII when it rescinded an offer of 
employment pursuant to its race-neutral grooming policy when the 
applicant refused to cut off her dreadlocks. The decision resulted in 
placing an undue burden on Black women because it allowed 
grooming policies to permit the disparate treatment of, as well as 
to have a disparate impact on, Black women. Ordinarily race-based 
discrimination suits are argued under either a disparate treatment 
or a disparate impact analysis keying in on the fundamental 
unfairness in opportunities to individuals who are identified as a 
particular race; while sex-based employment discrimination tends 
to focus on the undue burden that is placed on one sex (or gender) 
in accessing opportunities available. Because Black women do not 
neatly fit into the categories of race and sex, Black women have 
continued to fall between the cracks of civil rights as it pertains to 
hair grooming policies. 
 
 3. See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The 
court in Rogers discussed how the plaintiff could cover her hair with a hair piece (a wig) 
in order to conform to the grooming policy. Previously she had worn her hair in braids. 
Renee Rogers filed an action challenging a rule prohibiting employees in certain employment 
categories from wearing an all-braided hairstyle. Rogers worked as an airport operations 
agent, where she interacted heavily with passengers from issuing tickets, checking in, and 
helping with boarding. 
 4. See Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1030. 
 5. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000ff (2012) (protecting 
against discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin). 
 6. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232–33. 
 7. See, e.g., id. at 233. 
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Catastrophe Management also announced that racial discrimi-
nation had to be on characteristics that did not change and not on 
characteristics that are only important because of one’s race. This, 
despite a long line of scholarship dissecting and criticizing the 
decades-old precedent first rolled out in Rogers v. American 
Airlines.8 Indeed, prolific and accomplished legal scholars have 
written extensively on the fundamental error in Rogers, yet federal 
courts routinely apply the standard without regard to the fact that 
racism against Black women is intersectional, precisely because 
they do not fit neatly into one box (of either race or sex), and that 
this reality might warrant a more nuanced standard.9 Indeed, the 
 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See generally Dawn D. Bennett-Alexander & Linda F. Harrison, My Hair Is Not Like 
Yours: Workplace Hair Grooming Policies for African American Women as Racial Stereotyping in 
Violation of Title VII, 22 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 437, 463 (2016) (exploring how workplace 
discrimination based on grooming policies disproportionately impacts Black women); 
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 365, 396 (1991) (a foundational article discussing the fundamental error in the 
Rogers decision in failing to understand the ethnic significance of Black hair to Black women 
and the racial underpinnings in hair grooming policies that disfavor and punish Black 
hairstyles); Bridget J. Crawford, The Currency of White Women’s Hair in a Down Economy, 
32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 45, 55 (2010) (analyzing how a bad economy affects Black women 
more negatively than White women as Black women have an extra burden in grooming their 
hair to societal expectations); D. Wendy Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to 
Wear in the Workplace: Hijabs and Natural Hair, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 333, 368 (2013) (Chal-
lenging “a relatively universal judicial and societal assumption that employers’ enactment 
and enforcement of grooming codes are inconsequential to women’s access to, and inclusion 
in, American workplaces.”); D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair . . . in the 
Workplace, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405, 430 (2011) (discussing the hypocrisy of the juris-
prudence in ruling that it was not racially discriminatory for an employer to discriminate 
against a Black employee who dyed her hair blonde, while other White employees donned 
blonde hair); D. Wendy Greene, Splitting Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s Take on Workplace Bans 
Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, 71 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 987, 991 (2017) [hereinafter Splitting Hairs] (discussing how the federal courts 
have issued “hair splitting” in race-based grooming codes discrimination cases to highlight 
the extreme micromanagement of Black women in the workplace and indignity it brings to 
Black women); D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) 
Got to Do with It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1394 (2008) (asserting that “courts have hindered 
the efficacy if Title VII to achieve its mandate to ensure that individuals are not denied equal 
employment opportunities on the basis of race, national origin, and color”); Melissa Hart, 
Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005) (analyz- 
ing how easy it is for discriminatory practices to stem not from overt racism but unconscious 
biases based in racist and racially discriminatory stereotypes); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 
Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1132 
(2010) [hereinafter Another Hair Piece] (adding to the discussion of the original Hair Piece by 
examining the sociological and psychological biases in the workplace between good hair as 
White Hair and Black hair as bad hair and the disparate impact on Black women to achieve 
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jurisprudence around Black women’s hair becomes unique when 
viewed even in the broader arena of race-based discrimination. To 
illustrate, while the U.S. Supreme Court has been more nuanced in 
its treatment of race,10 lower courts have not followed suit in seek-
ing to understand and protect against hair-based discrimination as 
one of the distinctive racial identifiers for Black women. Following 
Catastrophe Management, one might not be blamed for adapting a 
dystopian view toward the prospects for legal and social change in 
relation to workplace bans on Black hair. It was hoped that the 
Supreme Court would utilize the opportunity to address the evolu-
tion of Black hair discrimination litigation at the appellate level 
when Catastrophe Management was appealed to the Court. However, 
the EEOC withdrew the case and the Court disallowed Jones from 
intervening in the matter so she could pursue the case on her own 
behalf and protect her legal interests.11  
This Note explores a very simple question: after forty years of 
failure in fighting discriminatory employment practices against 
Black women, why have federal courts tolerated regulation of Black 
hair in ways that ignore that those regulations may be pretext for 
discrimination against Black people in general and Black women in 
particular? That regulating Black hairstyles creates unequal 
 
good hair that is brought about by discriminatory workplace grooming policies); Janee T. 
Prince, “Can I Touch Your Hair?”: Exploring Double Binds and the Black Tax in Law School, 20 U. 
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 29, 50 (2017) (examining how Black hair affects Black lawyers from 
the beginning of their legal careers in law school); Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Tracy L. 
Dumas, The Hair Dilemma: Conform to Mainstream Expectations or Emphasize Racial Identity, 14 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 407, 422 (2007); Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, 
and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529 (2003); Michelle L. Turner, The 
Braided Uproar: A Defense of My Sister’s Hair and a Contemporary Indictment of Rogers v. 
American Airlines, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 115, 162 (2001) [hereinafter The Braided Uproar] 
(discussing that Rogers was wrong because neutral policies can discriminate, and still 
discriminate, because the crux of the argument that Black hairstyles such as braids can be 
easily changed is the understanding that assimilation into predominantly White hairstyles is 
easy and normal). 
 10. See, e.g., Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375 (1998) 
(discussing that the Supreme Court has moved toward treating racial status as a product of 
social and political institutions and has not definitely adopted nor embraced a biological 
conception of race). 
 11. See Imani Gandy, The U.S. Supreme Court Decided to Ignore Black Hair Discrimination, 
REWIRE.NEWS (May 16, 2018, 1:01 PM), https://rewire.news/ablc/2018/05/16/u-s-supreme 
-court-ignoring-black-hair-discrimination/. While I do not support the allegation that the 
Supreme Court “ignored” Black hair discrimination, since Jones’s motion to intervene was 
untimely—and only Jones must accept the consequences of failing to file a timely motion—
this adequately sums the events leading to the end of Catastrophe Management. 
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conditions for Black employees? Or, in other words, why have the 
federal courts not accepted that Black hair and its attendant natural 
hairstyles are the very essence of a racial feature for Black women? 
And what is the way forward? 
This Note explores this jurisprudential damn—the damning of 
Black women because of their Black hair. Part II explores the history 
of bias and stereotyping surrounding Black hair and its implicit 
connection to workplace grooming. Part III examines whether 
Black women should give up on Title VII so far as it concerns their 
hair. It analyzes the development of jurisprudence over the last 
forty years by examining the law, the critical cases, and the key 
scholarship. I posit that while it might seem that Rogers is here to 
stay, continued litigation challenging the standard is even more 
critical in light of Catastrophe Management. While advancing civil 
rights for Black hair at the federal level is important (since it begins 
to establish national standards), new methods of social engineering 
should be explored. To this end, Part IV begins to review the state 
level protections against discrimination based on hair and argues 
that lobbying at the state level could provide an alternative to fill 
the lapse in federal protections. Part V concludes. 
II. HISTORY OF BLACK HAIR, IMPLICIT BIAS, AND 
WORKPLACE GROOMING STANDARDS 
But if a woman has long hair, it is a glory to her: for her hair 
is given her for a covering.12 
For as old as the Bible, or as old as biblical record, hair and 
beauty have been inseparably linked.13 A woman’s hair has long 
been described as her crowning glory. The spiritual and social con-
nection between women’s hair and beauty and rank is not unique 
to Christendom. In Islam, hair is also considered an essential fea-
ture of a woman’s identity, with the covering of it an act of modesty 
and a public equalizer between women.14 
 
 12. 1 Corinthians 11:15. See also 1 Corinthians 11:6 (“[I]t be a shame for a woman to be 
shorn or shaven . . . .”); Proverbs 16:31 (“The hoary head is a crown of glory . . . .”). 
 13. See sources cited supra note 12. 
 14. Qur’an: An-Nur: 31.  
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In ancient African traditions too, hair has played a vital role in 
a woman’s beauty, wealth, marital status, religion, and rank.15 Even 
deeper, the way the hair was worn foretold the geographical origin 
of the woman. “In some cultures a person’s surname could be as-
certained simply by examining the hair because each clan had its 
own unique hairstyle.”16 The connection of hair to identity for Black 
women was never “purely cosmetic.”17 “Its social, aesthetic, and 
spiritual significance has been intrinsic to their sense of self for 
thousands of years.”18 
Transatlantic slavery changed all of that. In most societies a 
woman’s hair is her beauty; and its absence becomes her ugliness. 
Slavery made the Black woman’s hair ugly (as it made almost 
everything else about the Black race undesirable). This section 
explores the development and pervasiveness of the social cognition 
that has evolved to stigmatize Black hair and its hairstyles 
negatively laying the foundation for the type of discrimination that 
Black women face in the workplace concerning their hair. 
A. History of Black Hair Texture and Hairstyle: 
Centuries of Stereotyping 
In 2016, the Perception Institute undertook a first-of-its-kind 
study to specifically examine implicit and explicit attitudes toward 
Black women’s hair.19 The results are not very surprising. One in 
five Black women noted they felt social pressure to straighten their 
 
 15. AYANA D. BYRD & LORI L. THARPS, HAIR STORY: UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF BLACK 
HAIR IN AMERICA 2 (2001). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 7. 
 18. Id. 
 19. The “Good Hair” Study, PERCEPTION INST., https://perception.org/goodhair/ (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2019). 
The study included 4,163 participants: a national sample of 3,475 men and women, 
and a sample of 688 “naturalista” women from an online natural hair community. 
  The study included the Good Hair Survey and the Hair IAT. The survey 
assessed women’s explicit attitudes toward black women’s hair, hair anxiety, and 
experiences related to their own hair, and the Hair IAT assessed implicit attitudes 
toward black women’s hair. 
Id. 
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hair for work.20 On average, White women deemed Black hair to be 
unprofessional and demonstrated an explicit bias against it, rating 
it as “less beautiful, less sexy/attractive, and less professional than 
smooth” (or straight) hair.21 
Across all groups in the study (broken down into a national 
sample and a niche sample for the natural hair community),22 there 
was a strong implicit bias against Black hair in its natural texture. 
When asked what “good hair” was, some of the responses included 
“hair that is acceptable to the majority of society,”23 or specifically 
hair that was “straight, smooth, silky, soft, not frizzy, or not 
kinky.”24 “Some women link[ed] good hair to whiteness, explaining 
that the ‘good hair’ standard is based on the type of hair that white 
women have, and is often hair that biracial women have.”25 One 
interesting finding was that White women in the natural hair 
community subset still exhibited a greater bias than the national 
sample of Black women and White and Black Men, even though 
they demonstrated less bias compared to the wider White woman 
sample.26 The Perception Institute noted that generally White atti-
tudes toward Black hair were penalizing and negative, with the 
strongest stigmas held by White women. Unfortunately, this study 
was not an outlier. Two other contemporary studies documented 
similar bias against naturally textured Black hair and styles, with 
results showing an aversion to textured Black hair across all 
groups, and Black women experiencing deep anxiety because of the 
stigma about their hair.27 
 
 20. Alexis McGill Johnson et. al, The “Good Hair” Study: Explicit and Implicit Attitudes 
Toward Black Women’s Hair, PERCEPTION INST. 12 (Feb. 2017), https://perception.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2017/01/TheGood-HairStudyFindingsReport.pdf. 
 21. Id. at 6. 
 22. Id. The natural hair community is a social and digital community of women, 
predominantly Black, who support and advocate for the natural texture of Black hair and 
its care. 
 23. Id. at 11. 
 24. Id. Kinky is a descriptive term for the coiled texture of Black hair. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 14. 
 27. See Laurie A. Rudman & Meghan C. McLean, The Role of Appearance Stigma in 
Implicit Racial Ingroup Bias, 19 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELS. 374, 379–81 (2016); 
Susan J. Woolford et al., No Sweat: African American Adolescent Girls’ Opinions of Hairstyle 
Choices and Physical Activity, BMC OBESITY 1, 7 (July 1, 2016), https://bmcobes.biomedcentral 
.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s40608-016-0111-7 (straightened hair seen as adult hair whereas 
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These sentiments are not new. The explicit inferiority toward 
Black hair was not only one of the vestiges of slavery, it charac-
terized a large part of the denigration and dehumanization of Black 
people under slavery. 
One of the first things the slave traders did to their new cargo was 
shave their heads if they had not already been shorn by their 
captors. . . .  
 Given the importance of the hair to an African, having the head 
shaved was an unspeakable crime. Indeed, . . . “a shaved head can 
be interpreted as taking away someone’s identity.“ . . . The 
shaved head was the first step the Europeans took to erase the 
slave’s culture and alter the relationship between the African and 
his or her hair. Separating individuals from family and commu-
nity on the slave ships during the middle passage furthered their 
alienation from everything they had ever known. Arriving with-
out signature hairstyles, Mandingos, Fulanis, Ibos, and Ashantis 
entered the New World, just as the Europeans intended, like 
anonymous chattel.28 
But what does slavery have to do with negative stigmas toward 
Black hair in the present? Everything. For it was under slavery that 
the stereotypes regarding Black hair were created and reinforced.29 
To have Black hair was to have slave hair.30 And like everything 
else about the slave’s being, the hair was controlled by the master. 
Frequently shaving the hair was a form of punishment, a further 
debasement even within the slave population.31 Slavery took away 
the connection of the Black person to their hair in several ways. 
First, without the proper tools—such as a long-toothed comb—
Black women could no longer care for their hair in the way that was 
specific to its needs.32 Second, neither did they have the time. With 
death or dismemberment a daily threat on plantations, hair was the 
 
natural hair viewed as juvenile) (“The Social norm expressed by the adolescents in all of the 
focus groups was a strong preference for long, straight hair. The almost unanimous belief 
that such hair types were most attractive and could be worn by anyone . . . .”) 
 28. BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 10–11. 
 29. Id. at 17–20. 
 30. See Shane White & Graham White, Slave Hair and African American Culture in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 61 J.S. HIST. 45, 45 (1995). 
 31. Id. at 49. 
 32. Id. at 50. 
 
004.POWELL_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:33 PM 
933 Black Women’s Hair: Another Way Forward 
 941 
least of a slave’ s concerns, causing their hair to tangle easily or to 
be covered in a wrap for protection.33  
Third, Black hair was slave hair. “The hair was considered the 
most telling feature of negro status, more than the color of the 
skin.”34 The “negro status” was that of a sub-human with the very 
hair being characterized with non-human qualities such as wool or 
bush or cotton.35 By their hair you could know them, because 
distinguishing a free Black from a slave was almost immediate by 
looking at their hair.36 Fourth, “[o]nce the feminine beauty ideal 
was characterized as requiring ‘long straight hair, with fine 
features,’ . . . White slave owners sought to pathologize African 
features like dark skin and kinky hair to further demoralize the 
slaves, especially the women.”37 If hair is a woman’s glory, Black 
women get none; and the Blacker38 the woman, the less the glory. 
In other words, Blacks of lighter complexion were generally bi-
racial (mixed with Whites), and with that came a texture of hair 
more closely aligned and more easily shaped to the hairstyles worn 
by White women and considered acceptable in White society.39 As 
a result, mixed-race slaves not only were assigned less grueling 
(though not necessarily less cruel) jobs in closer proximity to White 
persons, but could more easily pass as free and held higher status 
than free non-mixed Black women.40 For these reasons, Black 
women sought to straighten and contort their hair to approximate 
White women’s hair. 
White hairstyles were a means of accessing opportunities not 
only under slavery but especially after it was abolished.41 Black hair 
was a badge of slavery where it reminded, and was used to remind, 
the now free person of her former status. In fact, it did more than 
 
 33. See id. 
 34. BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 17–18. 
 35. See id. at 14. 
 36. Id. at 14–15. Frequently runaway slave advertisements described the slave’s hair 
as a telling feature. Id. at 17–18. 
 37. Id. at 14. 
 38. That is, the more undiluted the racial makeup, showing in a darker skin, more-
coiled hair, and stronger Afrocentric features. 
 39. BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 17. 
 40. Id. at 17–20. 
 41. Id. at 21–22. 
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remind, as hair was used as a tool to maintain the status quo.42 Jim 
Crow laws required both public and private separation of facilities 
used by Black men and women from Plessy v. Ferguson43 in 1896 to 
Brown v. Board of Education44 in 1954. The legal micromanagement 
and oppression of Black individuals was so distinct and severe that 
there were laws that made it unlawful (1) “for a negro and a white 
person to play together or in company with each other in any game 
of cards,”45 (2) for any white woman to “suffer or permit herself to 
be got with child by a negro or mulatto,”46 and (3) for a colored 
person to serve as a barber to white women or girls.47 In a nationally 
sanctioned racial climate, racial identifiers such as Black hair were 
critical. As noted, hair was and is the primary identifier or more 
definitive identifier of race, even above skin color. To illustrate, a 
biracial woman (mixed Black/White) may have the same skin color 
as a White person; however, if her hair texture is not straight, the 
world will know she is Black. With Blackness then being gauged 
not just by color but also by hair texture, Black women arguably 
experienced a treatment even worse than Black men, both during 
and after slavery. 
Black women were subjected to the worst situations in 
employment under Jim Crow laws. Between 70 and 90 percent of 
all Black women workers were agricultural and domestic 
employees without minimum wages or Social Security. Black 
women generally received one-third to one-half of white women’s 
pay, which was one-third to two-thirds of white men’s pay.48 
The simple truth is that Black women have been straightening 
their hair for the last 150 years because it was and has continued to 
 
 42. Id. at 22. 
 43. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954) (establishing the separate but equal doctrine where racial segregation was held to 
be constitutional and the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was held unconstitutional). 
 44. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (establishing that separate but equal 
facilities were inherently unequal). 
 45. BIRMINGHAM, ALA., CODE § 597 (1930). 
 46. See Separate Is Not Equal, Select Jim Crow Laws, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM AM. 
HIST., http://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/resources/pdfs/unit1/3-jim-crow-laws.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2019) (referencing 1924 Maryland law). 
 47. Id. (referencing 1926 Atlanta, Georgia, law). 
 48. BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 637 (Darlene Clark 
Hine ed., 1993). 
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be a necessity for survival in the American economy. The quest for 
“good hair” has been so visceral that today it is a multi-billion-
dollar industry. To illustrate, at the turn of the twentieth century, 
the first female millionaire in the United States made her fortune 
from the Black hair industry in products designed to straighten the 
texture of Black hair. Products were marketed on a philosophy of 
“cleanliness and loveliness[,]”49 which in turn seemed to emphasize 
the underlying mirrored view that Blacks were unclean, unkempt, 
uncivilized, ignorant, unintelligent, uneducated, and infantile. For 
the majority of Black women, confronting this stereotype was not 
met with the type of resistance seen briefly during the civil rights 
movement with the afro puff, but through conformity and 
nonthreatening behavior, part of which meant getting rid of their 
nappy hair.50 
The next section more closely examines the stereotypes 
surrounding Black women’s hair and how they have impacted 
workplace grooming policies and standards. 
B. Clean, Neat, and Kept Versus Extreme, Eye-Catching, and 
Unprofessional: Workplace Grooming Policies Reflect Racial Stereotypes 
The problem with workplace grooming standards is not that 
they tend to be arbitrary, or even that they generally apply to all 
employees regardless of personal circumstance; rather, their 
arbitrariness tends to be rooted in gender and racial stereotypes 
that put minority women at a disadvantage. Ashleigh Rosette and 
Tracy Dumas call this the “hair dilemma.”51 They explain that 
women in general are in a dilemma trying to balance how they 
exhibit qualities generally associated with males (such as compet-
itiveness, ambition, and competence) with their femininity (even if 
a bias exists among female characteristics where “conventionally 
attractive women fare better . . . than less attractive women”). 
 
 49. Madam C.J. Walker, BIOGRAPHY (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.biography.com/people 
/madam-cj-walker-9522174. 
 50. BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 26. Nappy is another derogatory term for 
describing Black hair which suggests that the hair is uncontrollable, unkempt, naturally 
coarse, and tightly coiled similar to bushy or wooly. 
 51. Rosette & Dumas, supra note 9, at 407–08; see Daniel S. Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, 
Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1174, 1183 (1994). 
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Minority women must add the extra burden of negotiating how to 
present their racial identities.52 While women in general must bal-
ance femininity and attractiveness, “traditional American culture 
views Black women as less feminine and less attractive, as well as 
less intelligent, competent, and dependable in their professional 
positions than their White counterparts.”53 “[T]he hairstyle dilem-
ma for Black women is both uniquely racialized and gendered,”54 
or, the Black woman occupies an intersection between race and 
gender made unique by her hair. The fact is that a Black woman has 
hair that is different from all other races of women, so the hairstyles 
suited to women generally are not naturally suited to Black women. 
Implicit association tests have provided strong evidence that 
negative racial stereotypes are frequently associated with Blacks, 
and the studies mentioned previously demonstrate a similar 
phenomenon as it pertains specifically to Black hair.55 “In a society 
where straight, long, fine hair (compared to [B]lack hair) is viewed 
not only as the norm but as the ideal for women, tightly coiled 
[B]lack hair easily becomes categorized as unacceptable, unprofes-
sional, deviant, and too political.”56 Angela Onwuachi-Willig 
chronicles just how pervasive the reach of these stereotypical 
grooming standards are, describing instances of grooming policies 
in predominantly Black business schools banning Black textured 
hairstyles such as braids, dreadlocks, and other unusual hairstyles 
because in the White-dominated corporate world, Black hairstyles 
are not accepted.57 
The rejection of Black textured hairstyles is seen in grooming 
policies explicitly banning braids, locks,58 and unusual hairstyles, 
 
 52. Hamermesh & Biddle , supra note 51, at 1183 (women workers with below-average 
looks receive a pay penalty, as compared to women workers with above-average looks); Rose 
Weitz, Women and Their Hair: Seeking Power Through Resistance and Accommodation, 15 GENDER 
& SOC’Y 667, 673 (2001); see also Avera Martin, The Hatred of Black Hair Goes Beyond Ignorance, 
TIME (Aug. 23, 2017), http://time.com/4909898/black-hair-discrimination-ignorance/. 
 53. Rosette & Dumas, supra note 9, at 409. 
 54. Id. at 410. 
 55. See supra notes 21, 22, and 29. 
 56. Another Hair Piece, supra note 9, at 1107. 
 57. Id. at 1109. 
 58. Locks or locs is a different name for dreadlocks but is generally used to denote the 
hairstyle without any regard to the religious significance of dreadlocks as worn as a part of 
the religious observance of Rastafarianism. 
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or in policies that seem generic by banning unkempt, unclean, or 
extreme hairstyles.59 The question almost seems so simple: What 
makes a braided or locked hairstyle extreme and unusual? The 
answer is equally simple. For centuries, Black women have been 
forcing their hair into the dominant White culture, so when they 
stop, it is a very unusual thing and may seem extreme to others who 
are not Black. Additionally, when explicit racism gives way to 
subtle racism, things that were once outright inhuman, degrading, 
and disgusting, become unusual, extreme, and unconventional. 
This is how society reconciles itself in incorporating empow-
erment with oppression. One of the ways that contradiction is dealt 
with is through denial. That denial helps to maintain the stability 
of the society rather than root out all injustices. Most people like to 
believe they live in a just society that supplies adequate equal 
protections, but many societies tend to leave the most subtle and 
insidious harms just outside of change’s reach.60 Perhaps it is the 
subtlety of certain types of discrimination that precludes mean-
ingful change. So it is with Black hair. The societal discrimination 
against Black hair is one of those insidious harms (though it is 
certainly not subtle nor is the impact on Black women minor). 
 
 59. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, AR 670-1, WEAR AND APPEARANCE OF ARMY UNIFORMS 
AND INSIGNIA 3-2(d) (2014), https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/337951.pdf (“Exam-
ples of hairstyles considered to be faddish or exaggerated and thus not authorized for wear 
while in uniform, or in civilian clothes on duty, include, but are not limited to, locks and 
twists (not including French rolls/twists or corn rows); hair sculpting (eccentric directional 
flow, twists, texture, or spiking); buns or braids with loose hair extending at the end; multiple 
braids not braided in a straight line; hair styles with severe angles; and loose unsecured hair 
(not to include bangs) when medium and long hair are worn up.”); see also EEOC v. 
Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016) (grooming policy prohibiting 
“excessive hairstyles”); Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999) (hairstyle not to be too 
“eye-catching” or “different”); Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (employees must cover hairstyles that are “unconventional”); Helene Cooper, Army’s 
Ban on Some Popular Hairstyles Raises Ire of Black Female Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES (April 20, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/us/politics/armys-ban-on-some-popular-hair 
styles-raises-ire-of-black-female-soldiers.html?mcubz=0 (U.S. Army policy banning braids 
and locks as extreme (although later revised after significant public outcry)); Breanna 
Edwards, U.S. Navy Ends Ban on Dreadlocks for Women, ROOT (July 13, 2018, 9:24 AM) https:// 
www.theroot.com/u-s-navy-ends-ban-on-dreadlocks-for-women-1827571585?utm_medium 
=socialflow&utm_source=theroot_twitter; Christopher Mele, Army Lifts Ban on Dreadlocks, and 
Black Servicewomen Rejoice, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017 
/02/10/us/army-ban-on-dreadlocks-black-servicewomen.html. 
 60. AMERICAN DENIAL: THE TRUTH IS DEEPER THAN BLACK AND WHITE (Vital Pictures 
2015), http://byu.kanopystreaming.com/video/american-denial. 
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While society may have incorporated its longstanding bias against 
Black hair as almost normal, it is the law that is expected to act as a 
check against societal bias and make opportunities, particularly in 
employment, equal. Paulette Caldwell said it best when she said 
“Hair seems to be such a little thing. Yet it is the little things, the 
small everyday realities of life, that reveal the deepest meanings 
and values of a culture, give legal theory its grounding, and test its 
legitimacy.”61 Title VII has failed to achieve that mandate for 
Black women. 
III. SHOULD BLACK WOMEN GIVE UP ON TITLE VII? 
This Part proceeds by first outlining the protections and 
promises of Title VII as well as the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) guidelines on workplace grooming policies. It 
then tracks the jurisprudence on civil rights protections relating to 
Black women’s hair. This is presented in a mixed chronological 
fashion, exploring not only the major cases but also the scholastic 
commentary and development in light of those cases. Finally, a 
reimagining of jurisprudence on Black hair is suggested based on 
the analysis of undue burden. 
A. Forty Years of Loss: Title VII, the EEOC, and Black Hair 
1. Title VII and the EEOC guidelines 
Black women seeking a remedy for workplace discrimination 
based on their hairstyle have turned to Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Title VII provides in relevant part that it is unlawful for 
an employer 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
 
 61.  Caldwell, supra note 9, at 370. 
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adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.62 
Additionally, a claim may be brought under § 1981 of the Civil 
Rights Act, which generally protects persons’ equal rights in mak-
ing and enforcing contracts.63 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and 
exactions of every kind, and to no other.64 
A 1991 amendment made it clear that § 1981 prohibits discri-
mination not only in the formation of contracts but also in the 
contractual relationship in employment. While there is no defini-
tion for race given in the statute,65 the EEOC’s Compliance Manual 
notes that Title VII’s prohibition of race discrimination generally 
encompasses, among other things, (1) a person’s physical charac-
teristics or “[e]mployment discrimination based on a person’s 
physical characteristics associated with race, such as a person’s 
color, hair, facial features, height and weight”;66 and (2) culture or 
 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 63. Id. § 1981(a). 
  64. Id. 
  65. Neither Title VII nor the EEOC contain a definition of race. However, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) provides five racial categories: (1) American Indian or 
Alaska Native; (2) Asian; (3) Black or African American; (4) Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 
Islander; and (5) White; and one ethnicity category, Hispanic (or Latino). 
  66. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Section 15: Race & Color Discrimination, 
in EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (Apr. 19, 2006) [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL], 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html#VIIA. Other bases for racial discrimi-
nation expressly prohibited in Section 15-II of the Compliance Manual include (1) ancestry 
employment, meaning that “[d]iscrimination against a person because of his or her ancestry 
can violate Title VII’s prohibition against race discrimination”; (2) discrimination based on 
race-linked illnesses, “[f]or example, sickle cell anemia is a genetically-transmitted disease 
that affects primarily persons of African descent”; (3) “[p]erception: [e]mployment discri-
mination against an individual based on a belief that the individual is a member of a 
particular racial group, regardless of how the individual identifies himself”; 
(4) “[e]mployment discrimination against an individual because of his/her association with 
someone of a particular race”; (5) “discrimination against a subgroup of persons in a racial 
group because they have certain attributes in addition to their race. Thus, for example, it 
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employment discrimination because of cultural characteristics 
related to race or ethnicity.67 Title VII prohibits employment 
discrimination against a person because of cultural characteristics 
often linked to race or ethnicity, such as a person’s name, cultural 
dress and grooming practices, or accent or manner of speech.68 
The EEOC notes that “[a]ppearance standards generally must 
be neutral, adopted for nondiscriminatory reasons, consistently 
applied to persons of all racial and ethnic groups, and, if the stan-
dard has a disparate impact, it must be job-related and consistent 
with business necessity.”69 Specifically with hair, while employers’ 
grooming policies can mandate clean, neat, and well-groomed 
hairstyles, those rules should respect racial differences in hair 
textures and should be applied in such a way that they do not 
disparately impact Black women from wearing hairstyles that are 
natural to their hair textures. Two key prohibitions include (1) pol-
icies that prevent Black women from wearing their hair in an afro 
style70 and (2) employers applying neutral rules more restrictively 
to hairstyles worn by Black women.71 
Outside of these two limited prohibitions, however, the federal 
courts have routinely disagreed with the EEOC and have consis-
tently denied that Black women have a claim for racial discri-
mination when they have been terminated or lost out on a job 
opportunity because of wearing their hair in a hairstyle suitable to 
their natural texture. 
 
would violate Title VII for an employer to reject Black women with preschool age children, 
while not rejecting other women with preschool age children.” Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See El-Hakem v. BJY, Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Names are often a 
proxy for race and ethnicity.”). 
 69. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 66. 
 70. See Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 166–67 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(recognizing a valid Title VII claim where plaintiff alleged that her employer fired her 
because of her afro hairstyle). 
 71. See Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 661 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a reasonable 
jury could find Title VII violation where company prevented Black female from wearing hair 
in a “finger waves” hairstyle and in other hairstyles deemed “too eye-catching,” while not 
subjecting White women to such standards, even though the company admitted Plaintiff’s 
hairstyles complied with company policy that hairstyles be neat, well-groomed, and safe). 
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2. Cases and commentaries on Black hair discrimination: unequal 
treatment and disparate impact 
Following the civil rights movement and the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act, many Black women began embracing their natural 
hair and wearing textured hairstyles.72 When their employers 
pushed back on these hairstyles, Black women sought refuge in the 
law. Instead, they realized that federal courts would do very little 
to offer any protection. 
Plaintiffs can either bring a claim based on a disparate 
treatment analysis or a disparate impact analysis. This essentially 
means that the employer either deliberately treated members of the 
protected class differently compared to others and that this 
difference in treatment was because of an intent to discriminate,73 
or they execute policies that seem neutrally applied on the face but 
have an effect that is felt more harshly by the protected group.74 
Typically plaintiffs have brought disparate impact cases because 
the grooming policies have been facially neutral or categorically 
prohibit Black-textured hairstyles despite who might be attempting 
to wear them. 
The most prominent case is perhaps Rogers v. American Airlines, 
decided in 1981, where the court essentially ruled that American 
Airlines could legally have grooming policies that were discrimi-
natory to Black hair.75 Renee Rogers was an airport operations 
agent for American Airlines. American Airlines had a policy 
prohibiting women from wearing all-braided hairstyles.76 Rogers 
 
 72. See, e.g., Chime Edwards, The Impact of the ‘Fro in the Civil Rights Movement, ESSENCE 
(Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.essence.com/holidays/black-history-month/impact-fro-civil 
-rights-movement/. 
 73. This is the standard developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802 (1973), which outlined a prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII that has been 
more broadly applied to most discrimination cases. The Court stated that a plaintiff must 
show four elements: (1) “that [s]he belongs to a racial minority”; (2) “that [s]he applied and 
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants”; (3) “that, despite 
[her] qualifications, [s]he was rejected”; and (4) “that, after [her] rejection, the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s 
qualifications.” Id. 
 74. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–32 (1971) (holding that an employ-
ment test, though facially neutral, had a disproportionate effect in blocking the advancement 
of Black persons working there who were previously only allowed certain jobs). 
 75. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 76. Id. 
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sued, claiming that the policy discriminated against her on the basis 
of her sex and race, because cornrows were of historical importance 
to Black women’s expression of identity.77 
Previously, it had been inferred in Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual 
Hospital Insurance, Inc. that a woman fired for changing her hair-
style to an afro might have a valid Title VII claim.78 The Rogers court 
broached the topic in dicta and steered clear of pronouncing that 
the afro was, in fact, a protected hairstyle. Disappointingly, the afro 
was only discussed as a means to unequivocally pronounce that 
other Black textured hairstyles like the braid could be disallowed 
without any regard to the effect or burden it might have on Black 
women. The court simply saw no burden: 
Plaintiff may be correct that an employer’s policy prohibiting the 
“Afro/bush” style might offend Title VII and section 1981. But if 
so, this chiefly would be because banning a natural hairstyle 
would implicate the policies underlying the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics . . . an all-
braided hairstyle is a different matter. It is not the product of 
natural hair growth but of artifice. An all-braided hairstyle is an 
“easily changed characteristic,” and, even if socio-culturally asso-
ciated with a particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible 
basis for distinctions in the application of employment practices 
by an employer.79 
Furthermore, the court callously noted that even if it were racial 
discrimination, it was not so big a deal.80  
I agree with the many articles that have analyzed and con-
demned the Rogers decision. Some outright indict it,81 showing how 
steeped it was in blindness and bias.82 The court’s usage of the word 
 
 77. Id. at 232. 
 78. Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976). One 
“might” have a valid Title VII claim because, though not a plaintiff specifically, she filed a 
class suit seeking to represent all women, and Black women cannot represent White women. 
 79. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232 (internal citations omitted). 
 80. Id. at 232–33. 
 81. The Braided Uproar, supra note 9, at 129–47 (a fulsome discussion on why Rogers is 
wrong, noting, among other things, that neutral polices can be discriminatory and that hair 
was of legal concern to equal opportunities). 
 82. Caldwell, supra note 9, at 369. (“[B]y legitimizing the notion that the wearing of 
any and all braided hairstyles in the workplace is unbusinesslike, Rogers delegitimized me 
and my professionalism.”) 
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“bush”83 in describing the afro style serves as proof of the implicit 
bias that permeates the opinion. 
In truth, antidiscrimination law should contemplate and attack 
the negative associations that are behind behavioral manifestations 
of policies that deem Black textured hairstyles as extreme and 
unprofessional. Undoubtedly, hair grooming policies that would 
prohibit all women from wearing straight hair, but that would 
rather require all women to wear a braid, for example, would not 
be seen as trivial when most women do not have the racial hair 
qualities that support easily wearing hairstyles such as a braid. 
There has been no shortage of scholarly analysis and advice 
since Rogers on how to frame and legally combat workplace discri-
mination against Black hair. The next few paragraphs provide only 
a sampling of the scholarly literature in response to the Rogers 
decision. Michelle Turner suggested an expansion of Title VII to 
accommodate that a mix category (sex with race) produces unique 
discriminatory vulnerabilities that must be accounted for.84 Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig argues that the court simply has incorrect 
assumptions about Black women’s hair, and but for these assump-
tions, Black women “would already be protected from employers’ 
prohibitions of braided, locked, and twisted hairstyles, just as Black 
men (as well as Black women) are protected from certain employer 
restrictions on Afro hairstyles.”85 Onwuachi-Willig continued to 
say that the courts’ decision is because of a lack of thought and 
consideration for the nature of Black women hair. If they only 
thought carefully of the historical and contemporary bias and 
oppression against women because of the texture of their hair, 
“they would view employer bans on natural hairstyles to be just as 
discriminatory as employer bans on brown skin, another proxy for 
race and another proxy that can be altered with money, time, effort, 
and damage to the psyche.”86 
 
 83. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232. 
 84. The Braided Uproar, supra note 9, at 156. (“Congress should amend the language of 
Title VII to include the phrase ‘or any combination thereof’ to the text of the statute to make 
the law more inclusive. This approach would explicitly allow cases that allege discrimination 
based upon multiple categories to proceed without having to choose among the group 
statuses proscribed by the statute.”) 
 85. Another Hair Piece, supra note 9, at 1104. 
 86. Id. 
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Onwuachi-Willig argued that even if braided hair is not immu-
table, it is still rooted in the biological makeup of Black women, and 
grooming policies banning braids required Black women to make a 
biological change.87 Finally, she argued that 
Lawyers need to explain and courts need to recognize the implicit 
demands for changes in hair structure and texture that currently 
exist in employers’ prohibitions of black women’s natural 
hairstyles. Moreover, the law needs to move beyond viewing 
these required changes to black women’s hair structure and 
texture as reasonable. 88 
Paulette Caldwell asserted that the court did see Black women’s 
hair in exclusively biological of terms. Drawing a strict immutability 
line—between biology (the afro) and cultural artifice (braids, etc.)—
allowed the court to avoid the “basic elements of antidiscrimination 
analysis” such as group history, the oppressed position of the 
group over time, current position in relation to others, and if em-
ployment practices are perpetuating the subordination.89 
Turner was basically prophesying when she wrote that Black 
women would not be able to reach successful verdicts until society 
in general, and judges in particular, discontinue holding “unen-
lightened views on cultural issues.”90 She argued that discrimi-
natory hair policies seem neutral because those policies expect all 
to assimilate to the dominant hair culture and hairstyles of White 
individuals.91 She further argued that judges in turn have seen 
these claims as trivial because they too have approached the issue 
with an assimilationist perspective.92  
Since Rogers, federal courts have consistently denied claims 
from Black women when argued under a disparate impact analysis, 
essentially ignoring the scholarly contributions published in its 
wake. The next few cases are testament. 
In McBride v. Lawsaf, Inc., decided in 1996, a recruitment officer 
was prohibited from referring qualified applicants with braided 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Caldwell, supra note 9, at 377. 
 90. The Braided Uproar, supra note 9, at 119. 
 91. Id. at 129–30. 
 92. Id. at 119. 
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hairstyles to their clients.93 After repeated contestation of the policy, 
she notified her managers that she would file a complaint with the 
EEOC.94 She was terminated the same day for inappropriate and 
unprofessional conduct.95 The court dismissed the case, noting that 
the “underlying charge of discrimination is revealed to be not only 
meritless but also unreasonable.”96 The opinion stated that “[a]s a 
matter of law, an employer’s grooming policy prohibiting a braided 
hair style is not ‘an unlawful employment practice.’”97 The court 
did not even seem to really consider the fact that the employer in 
the case was merely an employment referral agency and the 
weeded-out applicants would not actually be working for them. 
The agency had no legitimate reason to refuse to refer qualified 
candidates with braided hairstyles. In other words, the weeding of 
applicants based on ethnic hairstyles was a direct result of the 
agency’s racial bias. 
In another case, Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., Patricia Pitts’s 2008 
claim was dismissed on summary judgment—not even making it 
to trial.98 In her ordeal, her White female supervisor disapproved of 
her cornrows, telling her to get her hair done in a “pretty style”99—
meaning her cornrows were ugly (emphasis added). At first she 
complied to avoid any trouble by putting in extensions (fake hair) 
and twisting her hair so that it would hang loosely down.100 Again, 
her supervisor disapproved, noting that it looked too much like 
dreadlocks.101 Pitts refused to change her hair after this second 
reproach because the company had no written policy on hairstyle 
grooming.102 The company then issued an official hair policy that 
banned “dreadlocks, cornrows, beads, and shells.”103 The plaintiff 
 
 93. McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 
Sept. 19, 1996). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at *2. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *1 (M.D. 
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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did not comply with the grooming policy and was later terminated 
for not complying with her supervisor’s request, and for other neg-
ligence on the job.104 The court ruled that she had no claim under 
Title VII because she had not filed a report with the EEOC and thus 
she had not exhausted her administrative remedies.105 The court 
did however consider her claim under § 1981. Categorically, the 
court stated that “[g]rooming policies are typically outside the 
scope of federal employment discrimination statutes because they 
do not discriminate on the basis of immutable characteristics.”106 
Or, that despite the history of Black hairstyles and the nature itself 
of Black hair being natural for textured styles, the bottom line was 
that a braid or lock could be straightened or pulled out and so was 
changeable to adhere to the policy. 
But federal antidiscrimination statutes were not drafted on the 
basis of mutable (changeable) and immutable (unchangeable) char-
acteristics of a group, but rather because of the historical oppression 
of certain groups based on characteristics unique to those groups. 
This is evident given that religion is a protected class and is in no 
way immutable. In fact, individuals are not born as any religion, 
though parents may raise them in one that they may come to adopt. 
Nevertheless, people convert and change religions. So too it may be 
argued that sex is not an immutable characteristic—even without 
factoring in transgendered individuals, the hermaphrodite phe-
nomenon is not uncommon.107 Skin color is also not immutable or 
unchangeable and can be darkened or lightened with ease.108 White 
women tan to shades that are similar to those of some Black 
women, and Black and Brown109 women lighten (whiten or bleach) 
their skin to achieve the complexion of White women. Interestingly, 
as noted earlier, the distinguishing racial feature between a White 
 
 104. Id. at *3. 
 105. Id. at *4. 
 106. Id. at *5. 
 107. For example, there are individuals who are born biologically as one sex on the inside 
and another on the outside, or who were not assigned the proper or predominant sex at birth. 
 108. See generally, Maya Allen, The Reality of Skin Bleaching and the History Behind It, 
BYRDIE (May 4, 2018), https://www.byrdie.com/skin-bleaching (discussing the phenom-
enon of changing skin color from darker to lighter; particularly its rise in post-colonial 
predominantly Black nations). 
 109. Brown is a term referring to women of color not of African descent, for example, 
East Indian women. 
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woman who tans and a Black woman who bleaches, is the differ-
ence in their hair texture. For this reason, when Rachel Dolezal—a 
White civil rights activist—began identifying as Black, her transi-
tion was not complete without manipulating her hair texture to 
approximate a Black coiled hair texture.110 
Five years after Pitts, in Campbell v. Alabama Department of 
Corrections, Campbell’s employer had a grooming policy that did 
not allow women to wear dreadlocks, even though it allowed men 
to wear dreadlocks.111 Andrea Campbell brought both a gender and 
racial discrimination claim.112 The court dismissed the case, noting 
that “[n]ot all conduct by an employer that negatively affects an 
employee should be deemed an adverse employment action. The 
action must be more than ‘some de minimis inconvenience. . . .”113 
Contrast that with Michelle Turner’s 2001 article referring to the 
grooming policies against Black hair as “spirit murder.”114 
While appearance choices may seem to be trivial “micro-
discrimination,” the cumulative impact of such small incidents of 
discrimination amounts to “spirit murder.” . . . 
 Workplace prohibitions against braids are not the only, and 
perhaps not even the most substantial, incidents of racism and 
sexism that a Black woman can and often does experience. 
Instead, such policies contribute to an overall sense that Black 
women do not deserve the same respect and opportunity that 
Whites and men are given. 
 Policies which have the effect of excluding Black women from 
the workplace contribute to other acts of racism and sexism that 
combine to assault the psyche of Black women.115 
One outlier that raised a valid Title VII claim was the 1999 Hollins 
v. Atlantic Co. case, where Eunice Hollins sued her employer for its 
 
 110. Scott Stump, Rachel Dolezal: ‘I Don’t Identify as African-American, I Identify as Black,’ 
TODAY (Mar. 27, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.today.com/news/rachel-dolezal-i-don-t 
-identify-african-american-i-identify-t109654. 
 111. Campbell v. Ala., Dep’t of Corrs., No. 2:13-CV-00106-RDP, 2013 WL 2248086, at *1 
(N.D. Ala. May 20, 2013). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at *2 (quoting Doe v. Dekalb Cty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1452 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 114. The Braided Uproar, supra note 9, at 145. 
 115. Id. at 145–46 (quoting Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The 
Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129 (1987)). 
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extreme micromanagement of her hairstyles.116 Her ordeal is worth 
highlighting to illustrate just how significant Black hair is. It 
certainly was not insignificant to her Atlantic Co. supervisors. The 
company’s grooming policy noted that “[w]omen should have a 
neat and well groomed hair style.”117 When Hollins came to work 
in finger waves (a short wavy hairstyle lying neatly on the head), 
her supervisor noted that even though the style was neat, well 
groomed, and safe, it was unacceptable because it was “too dif-
ferent” and “eye catching.”118  
Hollins resisted and re-wore the hairstyle but was informed 
that if she did not like the policy, she should work elsewhere.119 She 
changed her hairstyle. Later she was told that she had to have any 
hairstyle she wore preapproved by presenting pictures.120 When 
she showed her supervisors a picture of a braided style, they said 
no.121 She did this for over a year until she went to work in a 
ponytail—a style that many White women under the same super-
visor routinely wore. She was told that the ponytail was “too 
drastic.”122 Multiple work performance reviews noted that she had 
failed to wear appropriate hair styles.123 She finally filed a com-
plaint with the EEOC and at some point after was told that if her 
hair was “that important” to her, she should work somewhere 
else.124 Supervisors also lowered her performance evaluation solely 
on the basis of her hairstyle.125 
Surprisingly, even after asserting a disparate treatment case, the 
district court dismissed the case on summary judgment.126 The 
Sixth Circuit heard her appeal and held that a reasonable jury could 
find a Title VII violation where a company prevented a Black 
female from wearing hair in a finger waves hairstyle and in other 
 
 116. Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 661 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 117. Id. at 655. 
 118. Id. For an example of finger wave hairstyles see Image Search of Finger Wave 
Hairstyles, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com (search “finger wave hairstyle black women”). 
 119. Hollins, 188 F.3d at 655. 
 120. Id. at 656. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 657. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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hairstyles deemed “too eye catching,” while not subjecting White 
women to those standards—that is, White women were never 
reprimanded for wearing the same hairstyle Hollins wore and 
never had to seek preapproval for any of their hairstyles that could 
have been deemed eye catching.127 
Not one year later, in 2000, a district court in Louisiana ruled in 
Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel Ltd. Partnership that it was not racially 
discriminatory to prohibit Black women from wearing blonde hair, 
while White women were allowed to wear blonde hair.128 That 
might have seemed to be textbook disparate treatment, but the 
court reasoned that the case was about hair color, a mutable 
characteristic, so information on the individual (that is, of what 
race) who could wear blonde hair was immaterial to the case.129 The 
simple truth that the court chose to ignore is that the only difference 
between a Black woman wearing blonde hair and a White woman 
wearing blonde hair is the race of the two women. 
Combining all the failure, lessons, and wisdom of the past forty 
years, EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions in 2014 again 
challenged the persistent refusal to acknowledge the racial discrim-
ination in grooming policies that targeted Black-textured hair-
styles.130 This time the EEOC itself sued. Chastity Jones had applied 
for a job at a call center and, after she passed the initial interview 
and was offered a job, one of the human resource officers asked her 
if she was wearing dreadlocks. She said she was, and the officer 
noted that even though hers were neat, locks had a tendency to look 
untidy. The company had a grooming policy which provided that 
“[a]ll personnel are expected to be dressed and groomed in a 
manner that projects a professional and businesslike image . . . . 
[H]airstyles should reflect a business/professional image. No 
excessive hairstyles . . . .”131 This they interpreted to ban dreadlocks. 
In a press release, the EEOC stated that Catastrophe’s prohi-
bition on Jones’ locks and the broader imposition of its grooming 
 
 127. Id. at 660. 
 128. Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel Ltd. P’ship, No. Civ.A.99-3891, 2000 WL 1610775, 
at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000). 
 129. Id. at *4. 
 130. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 11 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (S.D. Ala. 2014). 
 131. Id. at 1140. 
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policies to target hairstyles more traditionally associated with Black 
women and men “discriminated against African Americans based 
on physical and/or cultural characteristics.”132 The EEOC further 
explained that in its view 
  [The] litigation is not about policies that require employees to 
maintain their hair in a professional, neat, clean, or conservative 
manner . . . . It focuses on the racial bias that may occur when 
specific hair constructs and styles are singled out for different 
treatment because they do not confirm to normative standards for 
other races. . . . 
 . . . Generally there are racial distinctions in the natural texture 
of [B]lack and non-[B]lack hair. The EEOC will not tolerate 
employment discrimination against African-American employees 
because they choose to wear and display the natural texture of 
their hair, manage and style their hair in a manner amenable to 
it, or manage and style their hair in a manner differently 
from non-[B]lacks.133 
The court noted that 
the outcome . . . is clear. . . . Title VII prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race, sex, color, or 
national origin. A hairstyle, even one more closely associated with 
a particular ethnic group, is a mutable characteristic. Therefore, 
the complaint fails to state a plausible claims [sic] for relief.134 
It is telling that the court, in its analysis that Title VII was only 
meant to protect against characteristics that are immutable, conven-
iently omitted religion from the list of protected classes for which 
Title VII offers protection against discrimination.  
The EEOC made a mixed biological and cultural argument that 
even if hair is immutable, dreadlocks were a natural outgrowth of 
Black hair that was “a reasonable and natural method of managing 
the physiological construct of Black hair[.]”135 Or in other words, 
while dreadlocks (or a twist or braid as less-permanent styles) can 
 
 132. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Commission, Mobile Catastrophic 
Insurance Claims Company Sued by EEOC for Race Discrimination over Hair Policy (Sept. 
30, 2013), https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-30-13j.cfm (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 133. Id. (quoting C. Emanuel Smith and Delner Franklin-Thomas). 
 134. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1143. 
 135. Id. at 1144. 
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be changed—by cutting them off and allowing the hair to regrow—
a dreadlock is a type of hairstyle that naturally comes because of 
the nature of Black hair. It is the sort of hairstyle that follows the 
natural growth of the hair because it is prone to interlock on itself 
because of the tight curls.  
To that the court responded that “[n]o amount of expert testi-
mony can change the fact that dreadlocks is [sic] a hairstyle” even 
if it “is a reasonable result of hair texture.”136 With this complete 
dismissal, the court essentially pronounced that the only solution a 
Black woman could hope for was if she wore her natural hair 
without it being combed or styled, or if she styled it in an afro 
(which has the appearance of being not styled). Only the afro is 
protected. The decision that the afro is not a hairstyle but the only 
immutable, and therefore protected, way to wear Black hair further 
showed the blindness of the federal courts to the nature of Black 
hair. To illustrate, the hair must be teased in a way that gives it an 
afro style. Black women do not naturally grow afros.  
Further, at what point does the afro become too visible/ 
distracting? Where is the line for the professional afro to be drawn? 
Should it be a small afro or a much larger afro? And how large can 
a Black woman go before she is disciplined for wearing the only 
natural hairstyle that is legally protected? If the plaintiff in Rogers 
had worked as a flight attendant with a shorter afro, would the 
outcome have been different? 137 
 In fact, Black hair is more prone to lock than it is to become an 
afro when left without the grooming that is required to produce a 
hairstyle. The natural clumping of Black hair produces locks after a 
while, and this is precisely why locks are seen as truly natural to 
those who take on that type of grooming. 138 
 Further the hair might be worn out in tight curls resembling 
dreadlocks, such as a twist out. Such a hairstyle allows the hair to 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. See, e.g., Image Search of Small Afro Hairstyles, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com 
(search “small afro”); Image Search of Large Afro Hairstyles, GOOGLE, https://www.google 
.com (search “large afro”). 
 138. An afro is teased out, compared to a wash-and-go hairstyle that generally involves 
no combing or manipulation of the hair. For examples of wash-and-go hairstyles see Image 
Search of Wash-and-Go Hairstyles, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com (search “wash and 
go styles”). 
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clump to together without forming locks.139 The reality is that it is 
only Black women who have had to endure this level of micro-
management of a characteristic that is unique to their race. As 
Wendy Greene laments, the Eleventh Circuit literally split the hair 
of Black women in order to uphold racial bias prevalent in 
society.140 And by doing so completely missed the heart of the 
argument at the foundation of Black hair discrimination. She notes, 
“in determining whether to dispense statutory protection,” the 
query should shift “from ‘whether a person could change a 
particular characteristic’ to ‘whether the characteristic is something 
that the person should be required to change[.]’”141 
Title VII might seem useless in helping Black women defend 
themselves against hair discrimination. It is clear that the current 
jurisprudence will hardly tolerate either a disparate treatment or 
disparate impact analysis. But should Black women give up on Title 
VII when it comes to their hair? No. When Title VII was passed in 
1964, there were many forms of discrimination that were not 
contemplated but that courts have since pronounced to fall within 
the statute’s protections. For example, gender stereotyping was not 
originally considered sex discrimination, but the reach of Title VII 
was expanded in the 1989 Supreme Court case Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins to include discrimination based on expected gender 
roles.142 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in that case added that the 
analysis under Price Waterhouse would serve as a supplement to the 
disparate treatment analysis outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corpo-
ration v. Green.143  
Further, the EEOC has successfully litigated claims of trans-
gender discrimination under sex discrimination jurisprudence.144 
 
 139. A twist out is when the hair is done in two strand twists, and then the twists are 
pulled out without being combed out, leaving more definition in the curl pattern. For an 
example of a twist out see My Natural Sistas, How to Achieve the Perfect Twist Out Every 
Time!!!, YOUTUBE (Apr. 23, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZIeuXzxXqYE. 
 140. Splitting Hairs, supra note 9, at 992, 1023. 
 141. Id. at 1034 (quoting Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1013 (W.D. Wisc. 2014)). 
 142. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 143. Id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 144. See, e.g., EEOC v. Deluxe Fin. Serv. Corp., (D. Minn., Civ. No. 0:15-cv-02646-ADM-
SER, filed June 4, 2015, settled Jan. 20, 2016); Fact Sheet: Recent EEOC Litigation Regarding Title 
VII & LGBT-Related Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (July 8, 2016), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/selected/lgbt_facts.cfm (“The EEOC sued Deluxe 
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So, too, has sexual harassment been brought under federal civil 
rights protections.145 In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the 
Supreme Court explicitly stated that the language of Title VII was 
not limited to tangible discrimination, but that Congress intended 
to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women.”146 
Further, intra-sex discrimination only became a part of sex 
discrimination jurisprudence in 1998 when the Supreme Court 
ruled that Title VII prohibited discrimination against men by 
men.147 In that case, Justice Scalia wrote in the majority opinion that 
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils . . . .”148 A reasonably comparable evil 
to race discrimination is discrimination on the basis of hair texture 
and textured hairstyles. 
Perhaps highlighting the advancements in the jurisprudence of 
other types of discrimination protected under federal law (for 
example sex discrimination)—in comparison to the stagnation in 
 
Financial Services Corporation, a check-printing and financial services corporation, alleging 
that after charging party, Britney Austin, began to present at work as a woman and informed 
her supervisors that she was transgender, Deluxe refused to let her use the women’s 
restroom in violation of Title VII. The Commission further alleged that supervisors and 
coworkers subjected her to a hostile work environment, including hurtful epithets and 
intentionally using the wrong gender pronouns to refer to her. As part of a settlement 
agreement, Deluxe agreed to pay $115,000 in damages. Furthermore, a three-year consent 
decree provides that Deluxe will not make exclusions in their healthcare benefits plan for 
medically necessary care based on transgender status, will revise employment policies 
including a commitment to preventing unlawful sex discrimination, and will provide 
employee training explaining that unlawful sex discrimination includes discrimination 
based on sex-stereotypes, gender-identity, and transgender status.”). But see, Laura Jarrett, 
Sessions Says Civil Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Transgender Workers, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 5, 2017, 
11:58 AM) http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/05/politics/jeff-sessions-transgender-title-vii 
/index.html (noting that Attorney General Sessions issued a memo on behalf of the Justice 
Department, in which they determined that Title VII does not protect transgendered persons 
from employment discrimination). At last update (July 2016), the EEOC had four LGBT-
related discrimination cases pending; it will be interesting to see if federal courts abandon 
their trajectory toward protecting LGBT persons under sex discrimination law in light of this. 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra. 
 145. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (resolving whether 
the Civil Rights Act prohibited the creation of a “hostile work environment” or if it was 
limited to tangible economic discrimination in the workplace). 
 146. Id. (quoting L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) 
(emphasis added). 
 147. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 148. Id. at 79. 
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Black hair discrimination—only reinforces the point that the harms 
to Black women as a group remain largely invisible. What is clear, 
however, is that the same arguments are unlikely to produce the 
desired results. The courts are not convinced. They may never be. 
But perhaps it is time to look beyond unequal treatment and 
disparate impact analysis and begin to push an unequal burden 
analysis typical of sex and sex-plus discrimination cases. 
B. Crafting a New Jurisprudence Based on Undue Burden 
There is nothing in the drafting of Title VII or § 1981 that de-
mands that race, color, sex, religion, or national origin be mutually 
exclusive. It is telling that when it comes to Black women’s hair, 
federal jurisprudence has rejected that a Black woman might have 
a combined claim based on both her race and sex. In Lam v. 
University of Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit held that the lower court 
erred when it treated the claim of an Asian woman in terms of 
either race or sex.149 They further held that the lower court should 
have considered whether discrimination occurred because of the 
plaintiff’s race and sex combined.150 A combined consideration of 
both sex and race might help to highlight the difference in treat-
ment and impact that Black women face in presenting a professional 
look at work. 
Even beyond unequal treatment and disparate impact, argumen-
tation should push toward a greater emphasis on an unequal burden 
analysis, which more appropriately combines intersections in dis-
crimination analysis. This might be applied as between Black 
women and women of other races such as in sex-plus cases where 
a pregnant woman might have a different burden, or even unequal 
treatment, compared to non-pregnant women. Additionally, it 
might be applied as between Black women and men. 
To illustrate, in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Company, Inc., a 
White female plaintiff sued her employer for its grooming policy, 
which required women to wear makeup and wear their hair down. 
The court ruled that it would not take notice of the burden the 
woman faced in complying with the policy because she had not 
 
 149. Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561–62 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 150. Id. 
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presented the necessary statistics to back up her claim, that 
following the grooming policy was significantly harder or unrea-
sonable for her.151 The court reasoned that it was not unreasonable 
for her to wear her hair down or to wear makeup. 
But what if Jespersen were a Black woman being asked to 
comply with a policy that mandated her hair always be worn 
down? We have already established that Black hair does not 
naturally grow downward because the curl pattern creates a 
density that makes the hair go outward and upward. Weighing the 
hair down involves styling it in braids, dreadlocks, twists, or 
significantly altering the natural curl pattern through straightening 
with heat and chemicals. All of this is at no insignificant burden in 
time and cost. While personal grooming for women tends to be 
more than for men, the cost of hair grooming for women to comply 
with a “hair down” policy is significantly higher for Black women 
than for other races of women.152 “Black women, in particular, 
spend an estimated $7.5 billion annually on beauty products, 
shelling out 80% more on cosmetics and twice as much on skin care 
as their non-Black counterparts.”153 Even the cost at individual hair 
salons is more with one woman noting that she pays twenty dollars 
more than non-Black women to get her hair done, a practice 
generally known as the black tax.154 A prominent Black female 
blog notes: 
 Some of our favorite styles are some of our costliest.—
hundreds, if not thousands of dollars annually. Take a minute to 
crunch the numbers and when you do, consider the following: 
For Weaves and Braids  
> the number of packs of hair you will need for your head 
> the type of hair you want (synthetic vs. human) 
> how often you want the weave or braids redone 
> the labor that your stylist charges you 
 
 151. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109–12 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 152. Taylor Bryant, How the Beauty Industry Has Failed Black Women, REFINERY29, 
(Feb. 27, 2016, 4:00 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/2016/02/103964/black-hair-care 
-makeup-business. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Ashley Weatherford, Why Do My Salon Visits Cost More Because I’m Black?, THE CUT 
(Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.thecut.com/2014/10/why-do-my-haircuts-cost-more-because 
-im-black.html. 
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For Perms 
> the cost and frequency of a retouch (for perms) 
> the cost and frequency of a wash & set (for perms)  
For Locs  
> the cost of one-time fee for beginning locs 
> the cost and frequency of streaming, deep conditioning, and 
styling 
Don’t forget to tack on the cost of hair products, accessories, tip, 
food, transportation and childcare!155 
All of this amounts to a burden that is beyond comprehension. 
As the dissent in Jespersen noted: 
 It might have been tidier if Jespersen had introduced evidence 
as to the time and cost associated with complying with the 
makeup requirement, but I can understand her failure to do so, as 
these hardly seem like questions reasonably subject to dispute. 
We could—and should—take judicial notice of these incontro-
vertible facts.  
 Alternatively, Jespersen did introduce evidence that she finds 
it burdensome to wear makeup because doing so is inconsistent 
with her self-image and interferes with her job performance. My 
colleagues dismiss this evidence, apparently on the ground that 
wearing makeup does not, as a matter of law, constitute a sub-
stantial burden. This presupposes that Jespersen is unreasonable 
or idiosyncratic in her discomfort. Why so? Whether to wear 
cosmetics—literally, the face one presents to the world—is an 
intensely personal choice. Makeup, moreover, touches delicate 
parts of the anatomy—the lips, the eyes, the cheeks—and can 
cause serious discomfort, sometimes even allergic reactions, for 
someone unaccustomed to wearing it.156 
What is more, Black women tend to be criticized and ostracized 
for not adjusting to societal norms and expectations and expending 
the great costs in maintaining hairstyles that are appropriate. 
Rosette and Dumas chronicle the extraordinary burden that 
 
 155. Kara Stevens, Split Ends: Black Women, Money, and the Cost of Hair Care, FOR HARRIET 
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.forharriet.com/2012/11/spilt-ends-black-women-money-and 
-cost.html#ixzz51rCDL2B7.  
 156. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117 (internal citation omitted). 
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conforming to straight hairstyles places on Black women. They note 
that most Black women straighten their hair at a cost of approx-
imately $50 million a year on chemical straighteners.157 All of this 
comes at a huge emotional cost from forcing their being into an 
unnatural state and takes no account for the texture or socio-
cultural relevance of hair to Black identity and to a feeling of Black 
empowerment in a world that is geared toward Black sociocultural 
subordination. 
Even more than the cost, the risk of damage to Black hair is 
astounding and severe. Chemical and heat damage can produce 
balding and burns on the scalp.158 The fact that the Jespersen court 
did not even consider the burden on Black women as a part of the 
class of women is telling about the innate invisibility of the hard-
ships that the bias and stereotypes against Black hair cause to Black 
women. Nevertheless, as research is growing on the costs, risks, 
and burdens in maintaining straightened styles, Black women 
might be able to prove the discriminatory nature of policies that 
force them to straighten their hair. 
Another avenue that should be explored is seeking to raise the 
bar at the state level. The next Part briefly analyzes state-level 
protections for Black hair and advocates for social change at 
this level. 
IV. STATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION: 
TOWARD A HIGHER STANDARD 
While federal laws provide the baseline of protections available, 
many states have offered protections that go beyond Federal Civil 
Rights Acts, as well as expanded the list of protected classes. No 
state has offered protections for Black textured hairstyles beyond 
what is already contained in federal law, but this does not mean 
that doing so is impossible. Rather, the absence might highlight the 
lack of awareness and focus at the state level—if not shared 
complacency. Minority interests have usually been best protected 
at the federal level with the highest form of civil engineering being 
 
 157. Rossette & Dumas, supra note 9, at 411. 
 158. See GoodHairMovie, Good Hair ft. Chris Rock–HD Official Trailer, YOUTUBE (July 31, 
2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1m-4qxz08So. 
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getting a case brought up to the level of the Supreme Court where 
a positive decision becomes the law of the land. The famous legal 
civil rights activists routinely attempted to get cases appealed up to 
the Supreme Court.159 The zeitgeist might be making this type of 
legal activism more difficult, as civil rights activism becomes more 
diametrically opposed and as judicial views at the highest level lean 
toward conservatism.160 
Smaller safe spaces may be carved out at the local political level 
rather than the federal judiciary. This is not unheard of, although it 
would require a coordinated and persistent campaign. There are 
many areas in which protections have been extended. For example, 
as of 2016, twenty states explicitly offered protections against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.161 
Twenty-one states offered protections against discrimination based 
on marital status.162 Minnesota and North Dakota protect against 
discrimination based on public assistance status.163 Minnesota also 
provides protections for medical marijuana usage and creed in 
addition to religion.164 New Mexico offers protections for ancestry 
in addition to national origin.165 North Carolina offers protection 
for persons with the sickle-cell trait or hemoglobin C.166 Oklahoma 
has protections based on genetic information.167 Oregon has a host 
 
 159. E.g., the education desegregation legal battles. 
 160. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018). Currently, the Supreme Court has a majority of justices with conservative views. 
 161. Employment Discrimination Law in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia 
.org/wiki/Employment_discrimination_law_in_the_United_States#State_law (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2019) (States and territories include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Guam, 
and Puerto Rico.); see, e.g., Employees and Job Applicants Are Protected from Bias, CAL. DEP’T 
FAIR EMP. & HOUSING, https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/Employment/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2019) 
(including gender identity and sexual orientation as classes protected from discrimination). 
 162. Employment Discrimination Law in the United States, supra note 161 (States include 
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin, with the District of Columbia.). 
 163. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08(1) (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2017). 
 164. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08(1) (2012). 
 165. State Laws on Employment-Related Discrimination, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/discrimination-employment.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2019). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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of factors upon which employment discrimination is prohibited 
including, among others, breathalyzer tests, degrees in theology 
and religious occupations, victims of domestic violence or sexual 
crimes, and credit history.168 Michigan disallows discrimination 
based on height, weight, and marital status.169 Federal legislation 
was never meant to be the pinnacle of protections that may be 
applied but rather is a baseline. It was contemplated that states in 
their autonomy could offer protections well above the fed-
eral fundamentals.  
In state legislatures, passing laws that protect against racial 
discrimination based on hair is more feasible given the ability to 
assert more targeted pressure. State-level protections have proven 
to provide protection against discrimination across a wider cross 
section of subgroups; protections for Black hair is ripe for more 
localized social engineering; and doors for change may very well 
open to the legislature and not to the judiciary. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Racial discrimination against Black women is real and based on 
deep-rooted and long-standing racial biases and implicit stereo-
types. Moving forward requires understanding this history and its 
contemporary effects on the status of Black women in employment. 
While federal antidiscrimination law prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of race, federal courts have routinely denied that these 
protections extend to the vast majority of Black textured hairstyles—
with the only potential exception being the afro.  
Antidiscrimination suits against workplace grooming policies 
that outright ban dreadlocks, twists, braids, and cornrows, or pol-
icies that require neat, clean, kept, and professional styles (that are 
then interpreted to exclude dreadlocks, twists, braids, and corn-
rows), have largely been unsuccessful. There have been essentially 
forty years of failure with no change of pattern in sight. This does 
not mean that Title VII itself is problematic or that Black women 
should give up on it. Instead, new ways of arguing must be 
engendered that reshape the jurisprudence of Title VII. Arguments 
closer to sex discrimination jurisprudence might make some 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202(1)(a) (2013). 
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headway in securing protections. Additionally, Black women and 
allies should put more focus on state protections and lobby at the 
state legislative level to carve out safe spaces and provide examples 
that might then be argued at the federal level to end the indignity 
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